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INTRODUCTION
The passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 repre-
sents the latest extension of a form of government regulation that began in
the United States almost a century ago. Government standards concerning
the physical environment of the workplace were first promulgated in America
by Massachusetts, which required in 1877 that "[t]he belting, shafting,
gearing and drums of all manufacturing establishments, when so located as
to be, in the opinion of the inspectors hereinafter mentioned, dangerous to
employees while engaged in their ordinary duties, shall be, as far as prac-
ticable, securely guarded."' This standard covered less than 350,000 em-
ployees. Today, under federal legislation, 62 million American workers are
covered by safety rules which govern virtually every aspect of the workplace-
from asbestos particles to toilet partitions.
Compared to other significant government programs, safety legislation
has historically been uncontroversial. Early legislation was adopted in an
era when most forms of government intervention in business and labor
affairs were regarded as unconstitutional. A similar accommodating attitude
has prevailed in more recent times. The debate prior to the 1970 federal Act
focused on the administrative details of the proposed legislation rather than
on the wisdom of a large federal safety effort. The typically noncritical nature
of the debate is surely due to the moralistic nature of the safety issue. Even
to question the basic premises of regulation via safety standards is often as-
sociated with an insensitivity toward workers' safety. It is just such an ex-
amination, however, which is necessary in order to understand the regulation
of safety and to evaluate particular statutes such as the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970. It is the purpose of this paper to examine both the
theoretical and empirical premises of alternative methods available for in-
dustrial accident control.2
The first section analyzes safety as an economic commodity, while the
second reviews the alternative mechanisms for controlling behavior in a simple
smoothly functioning frictionless society. The likely complications of the
actual world are then considered, as is some empirical evidence on the control
* Assistant Professor of Industrial Management, Krannert School of Industrial Management,
Purdue University.
'Ch. 214, § 1, [1877] Mass. Acts & Resolves 599 [now MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 149, § 127
(1932)].
2 Throughout this essay accidents are defined as a unit of danger rather than a specific un-
expected event.
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of accidents. A final section examines the implications of both the theoretical
analysis and empirical evidence for the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970 and for recently proposed changes in the workmen's compensation
system.
SAFETY AS AN ECONOMIC COMMODITY
For all the moral anguish associated with accidents, it must be remem-
bered that safety is an economic commodity. It can be enhanced only by the
consumption of scarce resources which if not allocated to safety could serve
other beneficial purposes.3 In most instances, the resources necessary for
safety have an obvious economic character. For example, machine guards,
protective headgear, and safety directors all represent resources which could
be devoted to other beneficial purposes if not used to increase safety. Less
obvious, but not necessarily less significant, is the personal behavior resource
of acting with care and caution. Individuals act as though they derive satis-
faction from being less than perfectly careful. Certainly the individual who
consciously does not buckle his seat belt is exchanging an increased risk of
injury for the act of being careless. Therefore, to increase safety by avoiding
careless behavior infringes on the likewise desirable goal of a carefree work
attitude. 4 Without measures of how much satisfaction people derive from
being careless it is inappropriate to label this behavior as irrational; it is
rational behavior if the satisfaction of such an attitude is greater than its
costs.
Since safety can only be produced by the use of scarce resources, the ab-
sence of safety, as manifested in accidents, can itself be considered as equiv-
alent to an economic resource. As with other economic resources, a willing-
ness to risk accidents may yield certain benefits such as the ability to under-
take activities which produce wages for workers, profits for firms, and prod-
ucts for consumers. However, these benefits can be generated only with as-
sociated costs. The costs of accidents include costs to the worker such as
anxiety over potential accidents, pain and suffering, lost wages, medical care,
and rehabilitation. Other accident costs include delay and disruption of work
processes, the training of replacements, and damage to capital and raw
materials. Because the activity of work yields exposure to accidents, which
in turn yields both costs and benefits, it becomes desirable to weigh these
benefits and costs to determine the optimal quantity of accidents to be
generated.
If all the costs and benefits of accidents accrued to the same decision-
maker, determination of the optimal quantity would be relatively straight-
3 For a discussion of safety as an economic commodity, see Symposium-Safety, 33
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 427 (1968); see especially Spengler, The Economics of Safety,
id. at 619.
4 It may not be carelessness per se from which people derive satisfaction. For example, in
the case of seat belts it may be the utility of not wrinkling clothes or saving time which motivates
some individuals. If an individual is not aware of the riskiness of an activity, additional in-
formation may cause him to consume less carelessness and more safety.
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forward. A well-informed decision-maker would participate in an activity to
the extent that the expected benefits at least equal the expected costs. How-
ever, the costs and benefits of an activity such as work frequently accrue
to different decision-makers; for example, products go to customers while in-
juries go to workers. It is necessary, therefore, for society to devise mechanisms
by which the balancing of these costs and benefits can be achieved. The goal of
such mechanisms should be to encourage interaction so that decision-
makers gaining rewards from an activity can compensate potential bearers
of the costs, thereby inducing them to participate. In terms of industrial safety
this goal is manifested in the desire to ensure that workers are exposed to
accident risks only to the extent that the benefits of these risks are at least
as great as the costs. The optimal amount of accident risk exposure is
achieved when the difference between the total of accident benefits and costs
to all parties is at a maximum.
II
THE AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVES
Society has several systems available to it for organizing and control-
ling human behavior so as to encourage mutually beneficial interaction. De-
centralized control through strictly private markets and centralized control
through government fiat are the extreme alternatives. Examples of inter-
mediate systems which combine private markets and governmental actions
include an ex ante (prior) government incentive structure such as price
regulation and ex post (retrospective) government scrutiny of market
activity as in tort actions.
Each of these alternatives is available for use in industrial safety. Use of
strictly private markets in which employers have no legal responsibility for
employee accident costs would yield a system of wage payments to workers
which reflects the costs of accidents. The use of government fiat would involve
rules about the specific safety characteristics of the work environment. An ex
ante incentive structure would be manifested in a system in which government
sets a price for each injury and the market is allowed to function within that
constraint-a system comparable to workmen's compensation. Ex post scrutiny
of private actions via the tort mechanism would be a system of review with as-
signments of liability for negligence based on established standards of per-
formance.
Although these mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, an understand-
ing of their operation is facilitated by considering each as though it were
the only system in effect. Each system will initially be considered as it would
work in a simple frictionless world with no costs of bargaining and enforc-
ing contracts, full information about alternatives, and completely transferable
rights and liabilities. In addition, both workers and firms are assumed to be
neutral toward risk; that is, they are indifferent between obtaining one dollar
or a 50 per cent chance for two dollars. After this delineation, likely sources
of friction and the implications of nonneutral attitudes toward risk will be
considered.
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A. Private Markets
If the control of industrial injuries were left only to private markets, with
no remedy for employer negligence, competitive labor markets with informed
workers would yield higher wages to workers in hazardous jobs. The mag-
nitude of the extra wage payment would be equal to the value which workers
placed on the hazards associated with any job. Under such a system of em-
ployee liability, two jobs, differing only in safety hazards, would be compen-
sated at wage rates varying only by the value placed on that difference. If the
wage rates differed by more than the value placed on safety risks, workers
would shift to the higher paying job until the rates were equalized. Sim-
ilarly, if the rates differed by less than the value placed on safety risks,
workers would shift away from the more hazardous job.5
Under such a private market system, an employer has a choice of how to
deal with the risks faced by his employees. He can allow the risks to continue
unabated and pay his employees the hazardous work premium to endure
them, or he can reduce the risks and pay his employees a commensurately
lower wage premium. The risks can, of course, be reduced only by an ex-
penditure of resources. In seeking to maximize profits, the employer will
choose that combination of hazardous work payments and accident preven-
tion expenditures which optimizes his labor costs. The optimal combination
of wage premiums and risk reduction expenditures will be determined by
their relative prices. The rational employer will expend resources on accident
prevention as long as the expected marginal cost of those expenditures is
less than the expected marginal return. The returns would be a decrease in
some of the employer's direct accident costs such as damaged machinery as
well as a decrease in the wage premium. This result can be considered eco-
nomically efficient to society since, on the average, injuries will be prevented
whenever the expected costs of bearing the injury are greater than or equal
to the expected costs of prevention.
B. Ex Ante Structured Incentive
In an ex ante incentive system, the employer has absolute liability for all
costs of employee accidents and the market will no longer yield a hazardous
work premium because the workers' injury costs, including discomfort due to
the risk of accidents, are now zero. An injured worker will be reimbursed for
all of his costs in the form of post-injury compensation. In seeking to optimize
his net cost of labor, including the cost of accident prevention, the employer
will spend resources on any prevention measure that returns more than it
costs. As under a system of employee liability, the employer will continue these
expenditures until the expected marginal return equals the expected marginal
cost.
If the assumption is made that the employer can bargain without cost
for prevention of accidents which the employees can most efficiently prevent,
The existence of wage differentials based on risk was noted by Adam Smith in 1776.
See A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 100 (Modem Library ed. 1937).
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the result does not depend on the relative efficiency of either party in pre-
venting accidents. For example, assume a given type of accident can be pre-
vented either with an investment in machinery or with a less costly invest-
ment in careful behavior by the workers. Because of the lower costs, it
would be efficient for the workers to prevent this type of accident. This ef-
ficient result will occur independently of which party has liability, providing
there are no negotiating costs. If the workers are liable for accident costs,
they will prevent this type of accident. If the firm is liable, it will induce the
employees to prevent this type of accident by paying them some part of the
difference between the cost of machinery and the careful behavior. Similarly,
if the firm is most efficient at a particular aspect of prevention or benefit pro-
vision, the firm will provide the service. As an example, assume that protec-
tive headgear is useful for accident prevention and that it is less expensive
when purchased through the firm. The firm would provide this equipment
even under a system of employee liability because this is the least costly
method of avoiding certain accident costs.
With either employee or employer liability for accident costs, resources
will be spent on accident prevention until the expected costs of prevention
equal the expected benefit. The costs and returns to prevention are quan-
titatively the same in each case. The only difference is that the benefits will
be manifested in different forms. Under employee liability, the manifestation
will be a reduction in the wage premium, while under employer liability the
manifestation will be a reduction in post-injury costs. Since the pattern of
employee and employer prevention is the same, the allocation of resources is
identical under either arrangement.
An arrangement under which the employer must provide post-injury pay-
ments to workers which are less than 100 per cent of the employee's acci-
dent costs can be viewed as a combination of the above absolute systems. The
benefits of prevention would be manifested as a combination of reduction in
hazardous work premiums and reduction in post-injury costs as the market
would generate wage premiums reflecting the employee's accident costs not
guaranteed by the firm. In total, the benefits and costs of accidents remain
the same since the components are simply varying forms of the same under-
lying values.
The distribution of income is also invariant with respect to each form of
liability. The worker receives the costs of the risks he is bearing in the form
of either regular wage premiums, after injury compensation, or a combination
thereof. The firm's outlays are also the same, with only the form of payment
varying.
C. The Tort Mechanism
Although the visible mechanics of tort actions take place after a particular
act, the potential liabilities implicit in such a system may constitute a device
for controlling behavior. Such potential incentives take the form of legal
precedents which provide a set of rules by which parties must conduct them-
selves if they are to avoid liability for damages. With such an established
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body of common law, the probability of either an employee or an employer
being liable for accident costs is ex ante determinable, although not neces-
sarily with a high degree of reliability. The expected proportion of employee
or employer negligence then becomes the mechanism by which each party
determines his liability. If either party is considered negligent when he fails
to engage in prevention activities where the expected cost of that prevention
is less than the expected benefits, these legal rules will be economically effi-
cient. As noted by Posner, the negligence standard formulated by Judge
Learned Hand fits this standard of efficiency.6
To the extent an employee aoes not expect his full accident costs to be
covered by the employer, he will require a wage premium to equalize his
remuneration with other opportunities. The rules for determining negligence
are the forces which yield the expectations of each party. If those rules are
changed such that the probability of liability changes for each party, the
wage premium will adjust to reflect this change. For example, assume that
under a tort system with a fellow-servant exemption for employer liability,7
an employee perceives the arrangement as a 50 per cent chance of receiving
all accident costs. If the fellow-servant rule is voided, thereby increasing the
probability of employer liability, the burden, of accidents to the employee is
decreased, thereby yielding a reduction in the wage premium.
The added costs of correct determination may appear burdensome in that
legal fees are usually a significant percentage of the total award.8 The bene-
fits of legal proceedings, however, may greatly outweigh their costs. This
could occur if the incentives created by such a system were more accurate
and distinct than those present under alternative systems. Furthermore, under
a system with relatively stable common law rules, these fees need be incurred
6 Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUDIES 29, 32 (1972). The negligence
standard formulated by Judge Learned Hand is a derivation from two separate opinions. In the
first, Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940), Judge Hand wrote: "The degree of
care demanded of a person ... is the resultant of three factors: the likelihood that his conduct
will injure others, taken with the seriousness of the injury if it happens, and balanced against
the interest which he must sacrifice to avoid the risk." Judge Hand supplemented his original
formulation in his opinion for the court in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173
(2d Cir. 1947), when he suggested that:
the owner's duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against resulting injuries
is a function of three variables: (1) the probability that she [a barge] will break away;
(2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions.
Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the prob-
ability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is
less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL.
7 The fellow-servant rule is that an employer is not liable for employee injuries which are
caused by fellow employees.
8 The presence of a seemingly burdensome cost is not necessarily a reliable measure of the
efficiency of a system. Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15
J. LAw & ECON. 337 (1972), examined the price of comparable eyeglasses in states
which prohibited advertising and in states which allowed advertising. Even though advertising
was found to be a substantial percentage of price in the states which allowed advertising,
the total price of eyeglasses was significantly lower in advertising states. Benham ascribes this
phenomenon to the fact that advertising provides information which, in turn, yields a more
competitive and efficient market. Analogously, the presence of significant court costs does not
necessarily mean that a tort system is inefficient. Like advertising, the benefits of legal pro-
ceedings may greatly outweigh their costs and be a necessary part of an efficient system.
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only when there are conflicting views as to the applicability of the rules
of negligence. 9
D. Government Fiat
For the purpose of safety control, government fiat involves the use of
standards for the physical environment of the workplace. If such standards
are individually tailored to the efficient methods of preventing accidents in
each workplace and if the government's goal is to promulgate rules which
return more in benefits than they cost, such intervention will yield the same
result as the other control arrangements.
The expected value of the distribution of income under a perfect fiat or
tort system would be the same as under the strictly private market or ex
ante government structuring of incentives. In each case the employer
bears the burdens of both prevention costs and employee accident costs.
Similarly, the employee receives the expected value of his accident costs
under each system. The only difference is that employee accident costs are
manifested in forms which are dependent on the control system.
E. The Effect of Attitudes Toward Risk
If either party is not neutral toward risk, there may be a preference for
certain forms of employee accident cost reimbursement. For example, if
workers are averse to risk, they may prefer a guaranteed payment of $100
in post-injury compensation to the 50 per cent chance of a $200 tort judg-
ment. Similarly, the firm may prefer to pay a regular wage premium rather
than risk the chance of a very large court settlement. Even with these pos-
sible preferences for particular forms of compensation, the alternative in-
stitutional arrangements will be neutral, if the rights established by each
arrangement are transferable. Under a tort system, if some workers pre-
ferred a guarantee of post-injury compensation to the chance of a larger court
settlement, the firm could reduce its accident costs by providing the guaran-
teed payments. The firm would agree to do this in exchange for a disclaimer
of court redress by the employee. The firm is in a preferred position because
its accident costs are reduced, while the worker is better off because he now
has the guaranteed payments which he desired. In this manner the exchange
of rights and obligations has resulted in a situation which both parties con-
sider more desirable than the initial arrangement. Therefore, even if the
initial institutional arrangement is not optimal, the parties have both the
incentives and the ability to change the situation to reflect their under-
lying preferences.
III
SOURCES OF FRICTION: TRANSACTIONS COSTS
The above analysis demonstrates that in a world of perfectly functioning
institutions, the nature of a control arrangement is irrelevant to the alloca-
' Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL IssUES 279, 285-88 (1973).
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tion of resources. This result, known as the Coase theorem, has generated
substantial literature in the past decade on its usefulness in the analysis of
public policy issues.' 0 Most analysts consider this theorem on the neutrality
of alternative liability arrangements valid in a simple frictionless world, but
demur to its applicability in a more realistic situation. It is generally recog-
nized that the frictions of actual situations may make the allocation of re-
sources dependent on the form of the control mechanism." These frictions
are usually subsumed under the rubric of transactions costs-costs in a sys-
tem which are required for its functioning but which are not necessarily
desirable for their own sake.' 2
A. Information
One transactions cost of establishing a market in industrial accidents so
that wage differentials provide control is the gathering of knowledge about
the probability and costs of accidents at alternative jobs. If wage differentials
are to develop which reflect degrees of risk, information about the riskiness
of alternative jobs must be available. It is often claimed that employees
consistently underestimate the probability and costs of accidents and that,
consequently, they do not receive the hazardous pay premium implied by the
frictionless theory of zero transactions costs.' 3 For this argument to be ac-
curate, all workers hired must underestimate the riskiness of the job. It is
the marginal employee who determines the risk premium necessary to at-
tract the equilibrium number of workers, just as in a competitive environment
with no risks the last worker hired determines the wage.
The competitive process of wage determination does not, of course,
guarantee that the equilibrium wage rate will be such that the last man hired
will have the correct perception of the job's riskiness. It does demonstrate,
however, that the presence of some workers who underestimate risk does
not doom the market adjustment process to this inaccuracy. It must also be
remembered that the wage determination process is not limited to the initial
hiring stage, and the probability of a worker underestimating the riskiness
of a job should decline substantially after he has worked at the job.
If it is correct that private markets do not optimally control accidents
10 The basic theorem was introduced by Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Lav &
ECON. 1 (1960). Two important collections of papers dealing with the Coase theorem are:
Symposium-Products Liability: Economic Analysis and the Law, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1970), and
Coase Theorem Symposium (pts. 1-2), 13-14 NATURAL REsOURCES J. 557, 1 (1973-1974).
11 In one of the few empirical tests of the Coase theorem, Thomas Crocker found that
liability arrangements did influence the allocation of resources. His study analyzed changes in
property values that resulted from industrial pollution. Crocker, Externalities, Property Rights,
and Transaction Costs: An Empirical Study, 14J. LAw & ECON. 451 (1971).
12 George Stigler has noted, "[tiransactions do not have a natural definition.... [Tihe
contrast between a transaction cost and a nontransaction cost is an empirical rather than a
purely formal classification." Manne (ed.), Edited Transcript of AALS-AEA Conference on
Products Liability, 38 U. CHI. L REv. 117, 128-29 (1970).
13J.R. Hicis, THE THEORY OF WAGES 110-11 (2d ed. 1963), describes lack of knowledge
about risks as one reason market determination of the quantity of safety is not likely to be
optimal. A study of natural disasters also suggests that individuals underestimate risks.
H. KUNREUTHER, RECOVERY FROM NATURAL DISAsTERs 27 (American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research Evaluative Studies No. 12, 1973).
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because of inadequate information about risk, the government might require
disclosure of each firm's injury record. 4 Alternatively, liability for em-
ployees' accident costs could be placed on the firm. The latter system, rather
than increasing labor market information, would reduce the need for in-
formation since the difference in effective risk among firms would be elim-
inated. Unfortunately, this alternative is not without its own associated trans-
actions costs since eliminating the costs of accidents to employees may re-
duce their incentive to avoid accidents.
B. Bargaining
Bargaining among parties' 5 to achieve an efficient situation involves
transactions costs such as searching for the least costly preventer, trading
obligations, and enforcing contracts. If one party is the least costly preventer
of most accidents, assignment of liability to this party would minimize these
costs and thereby achieve the best available situation. For example, if there
are significant economies of scale in accident prevention, then the employer
is likely to be the least costly preventer of most accidents. On the other hand,
if employee carelessness is a major factor in producing accidents, the assign-
ment of liability to the employer is likely to generate more accidents than
under other arrangements.' 6
Under either employer or employee liability, there is a danger of insurance
protection reducing incentives for self-protective behavior. If employees use
the hazardous work premiums to save against future losses, the equilibrium
amount of carelessness would not appear to be influenced because the full
cost of carelessness would be borne by the employee. However, if employees
are risk averse and choose market insurance, a potential inducement to care-
lessness, known as moral hazard 17 could develop. This occurs because each
insured individual may not incur the full costs of careless behavior. The costs
of this induced carelessness would be reflected in the insurance loading fac-
tor. This induced carelessness would be reduced or eliminated to the extent
that insurability or premium levels can be made a function of careless be-
havior.
If employers are more careless under employer liability, it would be re-
flected in the firm's riskiness and, in turn, the wage premium. Therefore,
because the firm bears the full costs of its careless behavior, there would be
no induced incentive to be careless. As noted above, under employer liability,
14 Prior to the enactment of workmen's compensation, the employer had a common
law duty to provide the employee with information about certain risks. This duty was limited
to a "warning of dangers of which the employee might reasonably be expected to remain in
ignorance." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 526 (4th ed. 1971).
15 These negotiating costs are not limited to the employee-employer relationship. Since
safe behavior by one employee has implications for other employees' safety, bargaining may
occur among employees.
" This could happen for two reasons. First, the employer is essentially providing insurance
for accident costs, thereby reducing the employees' reward for avoiding accidents. Second, the
employer is unable to obtain efficient employee carefulness because of the associated trans-
actions costs.
17 For a discussion of insurance and moral hazards, see Ehrlich & Becker, Market In-
surance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection, 80J. POL. ECON. 623 (1972).
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the employee is essentially forced to buy insurance against accident costs,
thereby creating a potential moral hazard. A firm which is self-insured would
have no related incentive to be careless. However, a firm which insures its
liability through market insurance would be subject to a moral hazard to the
extent its careless behavior is not taken into account in the premium. 8
Carelessness could best be prevented by a system of tort liability under
which carelessness is the basis for a finding of negligence. Transactions
costs might be large, however, if the law requires a determination as to neg-
ligence in each case. As previously noted, a formal legal proceeding is not
usually required for each case under a stable common law system. Whatever
the legal costs, however, their amount is not an accurate measure of effi-
ciency. It is the net value of all costs and benefits rather than the value
of one particular cost which must be considered. 19 Even when substantial
costs are needed to determine fault, tort liability is sometimes viewed as the
system likely to be most efficient. For example, in a situation where the
costs of making ancillary bargains with the efficient preventer are high, the
economies associated with elimination of the need for such bargains may
minimize total costs. If the common law standards for determining fault are
based on the relative efficiencies of each party in the various phases of pre-
vention, the need for ancillary bargains would be reduced. Where both par-
ties cause an accident, a system of comparative negligence may be most
efficient. 20 The causes of industrial accidents, however, are extremely dif-
ficult to determine. Analysts are unable even to make consistent assignments
of cause based on the broad categories of environmental and behavioral
causes. There is not even a consensus as to the appropriate framework
for analysis of causes.
C. Transferable Rights
Barriers against the transfer of rights and liabilities are another cause of
friction which may be detrimental to the accident optimization process.
For example, an employer under a tort system may find that his costs which
include legal fees, are much higher than they would be under a system where
he guaranteed all accident costs for his employees. Accident costs them-
selves may be higher under a tort system because of the uncertain outcomes
which such a system implies. Because his employees may not like such
additional risks, they may be willing to exchange their rights to a risky
court hearing with a potentially large payoff for a guaranteed smaller
amount of accident compensation. Thus, the parties may be able to ex-
" The presence of a moral hazard cost does not imply that insurance is undesirable any
more than legal costs make the tort system undesirable. See generally Demsetz, Information
and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J. LAw & ECON. 1 (1969).
19 Benham, supra note 8.
20 Comparative negligence is a system in which damages are formulated based on the degree
of fault of each party. See generally Posner, supra note 6, at 44-46. Posner concluded that the
rules of negligence create incentives for efficiency both in the mix of prevention activities and the
number of accidents.
21 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWs, COMPENDIUM ON
WVOREMEN'S COMPENSATION 287-88 (1973).
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change rights and obligations to their mutual benefit, yet such transfers are
often prohibited. For example, individuals are not allowed to exchange
their workmen's compensation benefits for a tort recovery; and pre-injury
exculpatory clauses are frequently not legally enforceable.
D. Bureaucratic Goals
One final friction which likely affects the mechanisms of accident con-
trol is bureaucratic goals. In describing the workings of an ideal system of
control by fiat, it was assumed that the goal of the bureaucracy is to require
safety prevention efforts up to the point where the returns to prevention
equal the costs of prevention. Since these costs and returns are likely to
vary with each firm it is unlikely that rules which are the same for all firms
will be optimal for each firm. In addition, it is unlikely that government
workers enforcing the fiat enforcement mechanism will be familiar with the
least-cost method of achieving a goal in a specific firm.
IV
SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE CONTROL OF SAFETY
Although the quantity of accidents may be influenced by institutional
arrangements when transactions costs are taken into account, there is no
theoretical basis for concluding whether a specific set of transactions costs
is significant enough to influence a particular control system's outcome.
Therefore, if one is to understand the impact of various control mechanisms,
empirical analysis is necessary. The hypothesis to be empirically tested here
is that variations in the mechanisms used to control safety have no impact
on the allocation of resources to safety. This hypothesis is based on the as-
sumption that transactions costs and other deviations from the frictionless
Coasian model are negligible.
The alternative mechanisms examined are workmen's compensation, govern-
ment safety standards, and private markets.22 Workmen's compensation is a form
of liability whereby the employer is liable, without consideration of negligence, for
a portion of each employee's job-related accident costs. Each state government de-
termines the portion of these costs for which the employer is liable. It is clearly
a form of ex ante structuring of incentives. Government safety standards are,
on the other hand, rules concerning the physical environment of the workplace-
a form of government fiat. Prior to the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970, these rules were determined by each state government.
If private markets control accidents, a wage premium will develop which is
positively associated with the degree of risk in each firm. That is, after cor-
recting for all of the other factors that influence wages, the level of wages will
be higher in those situations where risks are greater.
2 No empirical test of the tort system's influence on safety is possible within the scope of
this analysis, since workmen's compensation has supplanted the tort system in all but a few
industries. The Federal Employers' Liability Act, which covers railroad workers engaged in inter-
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A.' General Description of the Empirical Model 23
To test the impact of each alternative, it is necessary to develop a model
which relates variations in these factors to the level of safety. Because all
three systems may be simultaneously influencing the level of safety, it is
also necessary to use a statistical technique which isolates the influence
of each mechanism. The level of safety will be measured in negative time
unit equivalents, specifically the number of injuries per million man-hours
of exposure. 24 Variations in the injury rate represent variations in the level
of safety. If workmen's compensation, safety standards, and wages in-
fluence the level of safety, their impact will be manifested in the injury
rate. The injury data used are for the year 1967 from 2,627 manufacturing
establishments (each with more than 100 employees) in 13 states.25
State variations in workmen's compensation reflect variations in the
portion of employee's accident costs for which the employer is liable. An
actuarial procedure is used to calculate these differences in the magnitude
of the employers' liability. The procedure evaluates the benefits associated
with a standardized set of industrial injuries. Since benefits depend on the
state statutes governing workmen's compensation and in most cases on the
wage level, the benefits were evaluated for the laws in effect in 1967 at
several wage levels.
Prior to the enactment of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,
each state also had its own system of safety standards. It is this variation
in state systems that will be used to gain insight into the effectiveness of
this method of control. Although there are substantial differences between
the OSHA system of safety standards now in effect and the state systems
used prior to 1970, they are differences of degree rather than kind. There-
fore, an understanding of the influence of the state systems can provide in-
sight into the likely influence of the new system. Four dimensions of each
state's system are considered: the extensiveness of the standards, the
strictness of the standards, the amount of resources devoted to enforcement,
and the extent to which inspectors are used.26
state commerce, and the Jones Act, which covers seamen, mandate a tort system based on a
comparative negligence standard. W. PROSSER, supra note 14, at 435-36.
23 A detailed description is found in the Appendix to this article.
24 Three versions of the injury rate are used. They are the frequency rate, which is the number
of disabling injuries per million man-hours of exposure; the severity rate, which is the number
of days lost per million man-hours; and the serious injury frequency rate, which is the number
of disabling injuries which require four or more lost work days per million man-hours. Although
the severity rates most closely correspond to the economic loss of an injury, many analysts
consider frequency rates better measures of the controllable aspect of injuries. For example,
frequency rates are more heavily weighted than severity rates in the determination of work-
men's compensation insurance premiums.
25 Specific information about all data, calculation procedures, and statistical methods is
contained in the Appendix.
26 Extensiveness and strictness are measured by considering the standards used to con-
trol three major areas of safety concern. These areas are woodworking machinery, mechanical
power-transmission apparatus, and abrasive wheels. Although only a subset of the total number
of potential areas for standards, it is felt that they represent the character of the state's
standards. For these three areas of safety concern, the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI), a non-profit organization, recommended 301 specific standards as necessary for
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If the private market exerts an influence over the level of safety, it will be
manifested in an extra wage payment to workers which reflects the level of
risk. Greater degrees of risk as manifested in higher injury rates will yield
an extra wage payment to workers. Unfortunately, this payment cannot be
directly measured; therefore, the overall level of wages must be used to
measure the impact of the market on safety. This requires that wage levels
be corrected for other influences which they reflect. These influences
include unions, discrimination, and regional differences in the cost of living.
In addition, many factors which are embodied in the wage level can
also be expected to influence the accident rate. For example, higher levels
of education imply a higher wage level. However, higher levels of education
may also -enhance the worker's ability to prevent accidents and, therefore
lead to a lower accident rate. Moreover, higher wage levels reflect a greater
cost of lost work time from injury. Therefore, independent of any other fac-
tors, we would expect more effort to avoid injuries to higher wage workers
because of the higher cost of lost work time. If the wage payment for risk is
to be isolated, it is necessary for the empirical model to adjust the wage
level for those factors which are extraneous to the relationship between wage
and injury rates.
Just as there are several factors which simultaneously influence wages
and injury rates, there are other factors which simultaneously influence
other elements in the system. Whether safety standards influence injury
rates is one of the key relationships to be tested. Before the extent of this
influence can be observed, it is necessary to adjust for any influence which
injury rates may have on safety standards. Finally, injury rates must be
corrected for other extraneous influences, such as the age of the labor force
and the unemployment rate.
The result of these complex interlocking factors is a system of simul-
taneous relationships that is schematically represented by Figure 1. The
arrows represent the direction of hypothesized causality. An arrow pointing
in both directions is a relationship where the factors are hypothesized to
be simultaneously influencing each other. For purposes of determining the
effect of safety standards, workmen's compensation, and private markets
on the injury rate, the other factors serve only to isolate the primary factors
complete control. As a measure of extensiveness, the number of specific standards used by
each state to control the three types of machinery were counted. It is assumed that a greater
number of standards represents a more extensive set of standards. As a measure of strict-
ness, each of the state standards were graded as either (1) the same or similar to the ANSI
recommendation; (2) more restrictive than the recommendation; or (3) less restrictive than
the recommendation. An overall index of strictness is developed by giving a state no points
for each less restrictive standard, one'point for each equal standard, and two points for each
more restrictive standard. The total of strictness points is then averaged over all standards.
The amount of resources devoted to enforcing these standards is measured by each state's
industrial safety budget per nonagricultural member of the labor force. The safety inspectors
dimension is formulated as the number of inspectors per nonagricultural establishment. An
overall index of each state's safety standards system was constructed by combining each of
the four dimensions into one variable. The index was devised by calculating the first principle
component of the variables representing each of the four dimensions. This principle component
is then used to weight the standardized values of the four separate variables.
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under consideration. The resultant system of simultaneous equations was
estimated using the specified data base as indicated in the Appendix.
FIGURE 1
DIAGRAM OF THE RELATIONSHIPS
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B. Results of the Study
The results indicate that for most sample establishments the state safety
standards systems in effect in 1967 had no impact on injury rates. Estimates
based on a subsample of the largest 10 per cent of establishments in which
the data were weighted so as to equalize the number of observations in each
state indicate that the standards reduced the injury rate.27 The limitation of
the impact of standards to larger establishments is intuitively plausible in
that these large establishments are more visible and hence probably subject
to closer scrutiny by the regulatory agencies. Increases in the proportion
of employee accident costs covered by the firm had the effect of increasing
injury rates. There is no evidence that higher levels of risk are reflected
in the wages paid to workers. 28
The findings that there are no observable extra wages resulting from in-
creased injury risks and that higher workmen's compensation benefits are
associated with higher rates of injury are inconsistent with the implications
of the theoretical framework based on zero transactions costs. At least three
circumstances could account for the result that higher workmen's compen-
sation benefits are associated with higher injury rates.29 First, the uncer-
tain money flow associated with a given accident risk may be less distasteful
to the employer than to the employee. This difference in taste for risk would
result in the same accident risk being perceived as a lower cost by the em-
ployer than by the employee. As more of the accident risk liability is placed
on the employer, the cost avoidance reward for reducing accidents is there-
by decreased. Second, if insurance rates for equal risks are less for employers
than employees, a transfer of liability to employers could yield more injuries.
This would occur because the cost of insuring a particular risk is now less
and, therefore, the benefits of avoiding it are now less. If differences in
accident costs resulting from different risk valuation or different insurance
rates are to influence injury rates, it is necessary that the established rights
not be legally transferable or that the costs of transference be substantial.
If this were not the case, the parties would privately adapt to these differences
so as to neutralize any inefficiences in the established rights. Third, the re-
sults could also be explained by the presence of substantial costs of con-
tracting with employees for an efficient amount of careful behavior. As the
costs of accidents to employees decrease with increased benefits, the em-
ployees' incentive to avoid accidents would be decreased. Unless the firm
can make arrangements with employees for careful behavior, higher benefits
would induce less careful behavior and, hence, greater injuries.
27 The largest 10 per cent subsample included establishments with 779 or more employees.
28 Another study has found evidence that higher risks are associated with wage premiums.
See R. Thaler & S. Rosen, The Value of Saving a Life: Evidence From the Labor Market
(paper presented at the National Bureau of Economic Research Conference, Washington,
D.C., Nov. 30, 1973).
29 None was verified by the empirical study for in testing a theory it is important to specify
its implications prior to the empirical test so as to insure that the theory is truly tested, rather
than matched to the data. Such an ex post matching of theory and data cannot be said to
constitute a valid test.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY
The results of this analysis raise doubts as to the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of the systems controlling industrial safety in 1967. Although
certainly not conclusive enough to serve as the basis for radical change, it
is important to consider the implications of these results for the formulation
of public policy.
The finding that higher workmen's compensation benefit levels are as-
sociated with higher injury rates is not conclusive evidence that higher
benefits are undesirable. If higher benefits reduce the real cost of injuries
by eliminating a portion of the disutility from the uncertain income stream
associated with injuries, then the resultant increase in injuries is not
dysfunctional. Alternatively, if the increase in injuries is due to increased
incentives for employees to engage in careless work practices, then higher
benefit levels are not desirable. Unfortunately, it is impossible within the
scope of this study to distinguish between such potential causes for the ob-
served positive association between benefits levels and injury rates. It is also
possible that higher benefits encourage workers to report more injuries with
no change in real injury rates, but the injury rate data collection system,
which is independent of the workmen's compensation claim system, makes
this unlikely.
In view of this evidence, it is necessary to be quite tentative in making
prescriptions for public policy. If one is willing to assume that the observed
increase in accidents is undesirable, however, then the appropriate public
policy is to decrease rather than increase the level of workmen's compen-
sation benefits. Such a policy could, however, lead to problems in the at-
tainment of other social goals such as income maintenance. Determination
of the nature of the injuries which increase in response to higher benefits
would help in the formulation of public policy toward workmen's com-
pensation. For example, if minor injuries were found to be the cause of in-
creased accidents, it might then be appropriate to lower benefits for minor
accidents while maintaining or increasing benefits for more serious accidents.
The evidence on private markets is also subject to alternative interpre-
tations. The observed lack of market control over accidents could be optimal
if the costs of market operation are higher than the gains from controlling
accidents. On the other hand, lack of control would be inefficient if it could
not be justified as due to the costs of operating a market. The lack of wage
premiums for risk indicates that some transactions costs are likely to be
interfering with the attainment of market control over accidents. One such
transactions cost, often cited as significant, is information about risk.
A seemingly low cost remedial device for such a problem would be
the collection and dissemination of information about the injury rates
in each establishment. Such a program was mandated by the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 and is now in progress.
The evidence on controls is also difficult to interpret because even if
they are effective in reducing accidents, there is no guarantee that such
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efficacy is desirable. For example, it would not be efficient to spend more
money controlling accidents than the cost of accidents prevented by such
controls. The empirical analysis tested the more limited question of the
effectiveness of controls rather than their economic efficiency. The general
lack of a negative relationship between the level of controls and injury
rates indicates that standards were generally not effective in reducing in-
juries.
Based on this evidence, it is difficult to predict the impact of the 1970
federal legislation which initiates an elaborate control system using safety
standards. However, if the operation of past safety standard systems is a
valid indicator of the operation of current and future controls, the outlook
for regulatory effectiveness is not bright.30 The finding that the standards
influenced the injury rates in the largest establishments, however, may in-
dicate that the more rigorous OSHA system will extend this impact to
smaller establishments.
The National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws has
recently recommended increases in the portion of employee accident costs
to be covered by employers. 31 As with the new safety standard system
introduced by the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, it is dif-
ficult to predict the impact of these recommended changes because the pro-
posals are outside the range of the estimates made from the 1967 observa-
tions. However, it would seem unlikely that the relationship between bene-
3 0 The OSHA standards are roughly equivalent to the ANSI recommendations used as a
basis for calculating the extensiveness and strictness dimensions of the state systems. The
mean number of standards used by each state to regulate the three sample areas of concern
was 116 (range = 0 to 279). The OSHA standards are approximately equivalent to the full
301 recommended standards. Whereas the mean index of strictness for the sampled states was
.54 (range = 0 to .94), the OSHA standards are approximately equivalent to 1. No data appear
to be available on the number of OSHA inspectors. The budget per nonagricultural employee
is probably the most descriptive basis for comparing the state standard systems and OSHA.
After adjusting for changes in the labor force and inflation, the proposed fiscal year 1974 ex-
penditure for combined federal and state industrial safety standard regulation is $1.15 per
nonagricultural employee. THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1974-
APPENDIX 386-87, 644-45 (1973). The amount per nonagricultural employee was derived as
follows:
Occupational Safety and Health Administration $ 69,836,000
State Expenditures 30,080,000
National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health 25,600,000
Total safety expenditure $125,516,000
The total safety expenditure was converted to 1967 dollars:
(1967-June 1973): $125,516,000= $94,800,604.
132.4
The 1967 equivalent expenditures was adjusted to reflect the amount per nonagricultural
employee (July 1973):
$94,800,604 - $1.15 per nonagricultural employee.
82,201,000
Hence, the legislation is close to, but outside, the range of prediction allowed by the existing
data.
31 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAws, THE REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAws (1972).
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fits and accidents would significantly change at the recommended levels.
It is, therefore, probable that further increases in workmen's compensation
will result in increased injuries.
CONCLUSION
For all the difficulties and uncertainties associated with empirical analysis,
it is the only method which can provide a basis for determining the appro-
priate system of industrial accident control. We are at a point in our under-
standing of industrial safety where further anecdotes and even theoretical
development are of limited value. What is needed is empirical work to test
existing theoretical frameworks. Useful work would include investigations
of the nongovernmental determinants of injuries, such as workers' per-
ceptions of risk, market reactions to variations in risk, and the impact of
tort systems on behavior. In addition, it would be valuable to have time-
series analyses of the effects of government programs and of different
methods of administering them (including the influence of inspectors, pen-
alties, and educational programs). Only by such analyses can we hope to
develop programs which are based on more than just good intentions.
Appendix
The purpose of this Appendix is to provide a more specific and detailed
description of the empirical model used to test the impact of the alternative
control devices. As noted previously, many factors other than the control
mechanisms and injury rates had to be considered in order to isolate the
relationships which are of primary concern. Additionally, the simultaneous
influence of the injury rate on the control mechanisms had to be accounted
for in order to observe the impact of the control mechanisms on the injury
rate. The system of market and governmental forces which are related to
the injury rate is represented by four relationships. The estimation of these
relationships is based on a simultaneous equation system with four en-
dogenous variables. The first relationship in the system is a model of injury
determinants including governmental and nongovernmental factors. The
second relationship is a model of total wage determination; a model of
total wage determination is necessary because the risk premium com-
ponent of wages is not directly observable. The third and fourth relation-
ships are the determinants of the nature and extent of safety standards and
workmen's compensation benefit levels. The system was estimated using
two-stage least squares. The four relationships are summarized below with
the relevant hypothesis and the sources of the data listed with each
variable.
(1) The determinants of the injury rate:
INJRATE = al.0 + a,., (NEWHIRES) + al 2 (UNE) + al.3 (HOURS)
+ a,.4 (AGE) + al.5 (UNION) + al.6 (SIZE) + al.7 (CAPITAL)
+ a1 .8 (EDUC) + a, 9 (SEX) + a,.x6 (OCC) +a., (WAIT)
+ a11 2 (WAGE) +a 1.3 (STANDARDS) + al.14 (WC) + /.
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Where:
INJRATE = the number of disabling injuries per million man-hours of
exposure. Alternatively, the number of days lost and the number of injuries
of more than three days duration, both per million man-hours, were also
used. These alternative measures were used to insure that any observed
phenomena were not limited to a particular measure of the injury rate. The
injury rate is assumed to measure the level of safety in the firm. The source
of the data was from the Work Injury Survey conducted by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. 32 The sample was based on yearly averages and included
2,627 firms from 13 states in 1967.33
NEWHIRES = "[t]emporary or permanent additions to the employment
roll of persons who have never before been employed in the establishment
(except employees transferring from another establishment of the same
company) or of former employees not recalled by the employer."34 The
new hires rate is defined as the number of such additions per 100 employees.
Although not documented by existing studies, it would appear likely that
new workers would be involved in a disproportionate share of accidents
thus resulting in a positive coefficient. This could result from the new
worker's unfamiliarity with work equipment and procedures. The data are
from Employment and Earnings3 5 at the United States 3-digit Standard Indus-
trial Classification (SIC)36 level of detail for 1967.
UNE = the unemployment rate. This variable is intended as a measure
of the impact of the business cycle on the injury rate. During an upswing,
the price of foregone output will increase and, therefore, the cost of de-
voting inputs to prevention rather than output will increase. For the same
reason, however, the cost of an injury in terms of interrupted production
will increase. Also, to the extent the hours of work variable does not com-
pletely reflect the pace of work, it is expected that an increase in unemploy-
ment will lower the effectiveness of prevention measures by making workers
susceptible to injuries. Finally, the lower unemployment rates associated with
an upswing make it more difficult to replace an injured worker, therefore
tending to increase the price of injuries. This combination of conflicting
attributes leads to uncertain expectations about the net impact of the un-
employment rate on injury rates. The state's unemployment rates at any one
point in time reflect long run differences in their labor markets as well as
stages of the business cycle. Therefore, the variable was formulated as the
1967 state unemployment rate relative to the state's average unemployment
for the previous 5 years. The data are from the Manpower Report of the
President.37
32 See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1458, HANDBOOK OF
METHODS FOR SURVEYS AND STUDIES 197-207 (1966), for a description of the Work Injury Survey.
3 Unpublished files, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor.
34 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1312-8, EMPLOYMENT AND
EARNINGS: UNITED STATES, 1909-71, at 671 (1972).35 Id. at 36.
"See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, STANDARD
INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION MANUAL, 1967 (1967). This manual has since been superseded by the 1972
edition.
37 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MANPOWER REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 232 (1972).
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HOURS = average hours worked per week. This variable is intended
as a proxy for the influences of work pace and fatigue. Hence, increases
in hours are expected to be associated with increases in injury rates. Aver-
age hours of overtime and average hours of overtime squared were used as
alternative measures of this influence. The data are from Employment and
Earnings38 and are for the United States at the 3-digit SIC level of detail.
AGE = the average age of the industry's work force. Researchers have
found -a higher rate of injuries for younger workers. The relationship be-
tween age and injury rate is complicated by the possibility that older workers,
rather than being less susceptible to injuries, merely avoid jobs where there
is a high risk of injuries. The observed result would be the same in either
case-younger workers would be associated with higher injury rates. The
age variable was derived from the files of the Social Security Administration's
Continuous Work History Sample. 39 The data represent the average age
for each 2-digit SIC industry in each state. 40 Because of the smallness of
some of the sample cells, an average of 1967 and 1968 was used.
UNION = the percentage of workers in establishments where more than
half of the production workers are covered by collective bargaining agree-
ments. It is hypothesized that the presence of unions results in greater
safety. The potential impact of unions on safety could be due to factors
such as more vocal employee representation with management, formalized
grievance procedures, labor-management safety committees, or direct
union efforts with equipment manufacturers. Information generated by a
union could also serve to eliminate the possibility of a wage rate based on
an underestimation of risk. The data used for this variable were obtained
from an unpublished appendix to Weiss' article Concentration and Labor
Earnings.4' The data were estimated for each 3-digit SIC industry in 1965.
SIZE = the number of employees in the establishment. This variable
is intended to reflect economies of scale in accident prevention. Such
economies might include factors such as efficiencies in safety training,
the ability to hire full-time safety personnel, the use of production tech-
niques which are amenable to accident preventions, and stability in the time
pattern of accidents which in turn allows insurance companies to offer pre-
miums which are more sensitive to individual establishment experience.
The data are for each firm in the sample.42 It is hypothesized that larger
firms have fewer accidents.
CAPITAL = the gross book value of depreciable assets per employee.
This variable is intended to measure the influence of exposure to capital
38 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 34, at 35.
"
9This is a one per cent sample of those workers with Social Security numbers. Sampling
procedures are described in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, WORKERS UNDER
SOCIAL SECURITY, 1960: ANNUAL AND WORK HISTORY STATISTICS (1968).
40 Unpublished files, Office of Research and Statistics, Social Security Administration, U.S.
Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare.
41 Weiss, Concentration and Labor Earnings, 56 Am. ECON. REv. 96 (1966). The unpublished
appendix may be obtained from Professor Weiss, Economics Department, University of Wis-
consin, Madison, Wisconsin.42 Unpublished files, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor.
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equipment as a source of injuries. The data for 1967 are from the 1968
Annual Survey of Manufactures43 at the United States 4-digit SIC level of
detail. Greater exposure to capital is hypothesized to result in more injuries.
EDUC = the level of formal education of the work force. This variable
may indicate the development of skills which enhance the worker's ability
to avoid accidents thus resulting in a negative coefficient. The available data
closest to the injury data are from the 1960 Census of Population.44 The
data are classified by Census code categories which were translated into their
3-digit SIC code equivalents.
SEX = the percentage of women in the industry's work force. This vari-
able is a measure of the extent to which women or men are more suscep-
tible to injuries. The data are for 2-digit SIC industries in each state. The
percentages were derived from the Social Security Administration's Con-
tinuous Work History Sample. 4
5
OCC = occupational mix as measured by the percentage of production
employees. To the extent workers are engaged in more hazardous oc-
cupations, we would expect them to sustain injuries disproportionate to the
rest of the labor force. Although no data on the presence of hazardous oc-
cupations is available, a rough proxy may be the percentage of production
workers. The data are from Employment and Earnings46 and reflect a 3-digit
SIC level of detail for the United States as a whole.
WAIT = the waiting period, the number of lost work days required be-
fore an injury is compensable under workmen's compensation. 47 This vari-
able is intended to test whether a short waiting period encourages the re-
porting of injuries which would otherwise not be reported. It is hypothesized
that the coefficient on this variable will be negative.
WAGE = the endogenous wage level. The relationship between wage
levels and accidents has many facets-some of which -may create opposing
incentives. Factors manifested in the wage rate may influence the quantity of
accidents while, in turn, the quantity of accidents determines the risk pre-
mium component of the wage rate. It is this simultaneous relationship
which gives rise to the need for the multiequation model used to estimate the
relationships. The aspect of the relationship which predicts that the quantity
of accidents will determine a risk premium will be considered in the following
section on the determinants of wages.
The wage rate represents the opportunity cost of time and since injuries
cause a loss of work time, a higher wage implies a higher cost of lost time.
As the potential loss from an accident increases, we would expect workers
to devote more of their own effort to the prevention of that loss. We would
43 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MANUFACTURES, 1968-
1969 (1973).
44 U.S. DEF'T OF COMMERCE, UNITED STATES CENSUS OF POPULATION, 1960: INDUSTRIAL CHAR-
ACTERISTICS 98 (Bureau of the Census Rep. No. PC(2)-7F, 1967).
45 Unpublished files, Office of Research and Statistics, Social Security Administration, U.S.
Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare.
46 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 34, at 33-34.
47 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ANALYSIS OF -WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAws (1967).
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also expect them to demand more prevention effort from the firm. As more
effort is devoted to prevention, the quantity of accidents should decline. It
is also plausible that the ability to avoid accidents is positively correlated
with earnings ability and, therefore, wages. Such a correlation would rein-
force the negative association between wages and accidents. The wage data
were obtained from the records of workers covered by state unemployment
compensation. The data are for the 4-digit SIC level of detail for each state
from the first quarter of 1967.48
STANDARDS = an endogenous variable representing a composite index
of the nature and extent of government regulation using safety standards.
As discussed in the body of the paper, this variable is based on the first
principle component of four dimensions of each state's system. These dimen-
sions are extensiveness, strictness, budget per nonagricultural employee,
and inspectors per nonagricultural establishment. The standards data are
from the Bureau of Labor Standards' State Safety Code Comparison
Studies49 and cover the standards in effect during 1966 and 1967. The
budget and inspectors data were obtained from the Labor Standards Bureau,
Division of Programming and Research. 50 The index, although thought to be
an accurate measure of the standards system, is essentially arbitrary and
therefore a more straightforward measure was also tried. As a simple al-
ternative to the relatively complex index, the safety budget per nonagricul-
tural employee was used. This attribute was considered to be the single most
descriptive aspect of the controls system. The safety budget was alter-
natively used as an exogeneous and endogenous variable.
WC = an endogenous variable representing the level of benefits re-
quired by each state's workmen's compensation law. Variations in the level
of benefits represent variations in the portion of employee accident costs
for which the employer is liable. Each state's benefits were measured with
an actuarial technique originally used to determine the impact of statutes on
workmen's compensation insurance premiums. The statutes in effect on
January 1, 1967 were used as the basis for the evaluation. Within each
state, the laws were evaluated at each 2-digit SIC wage level to reflect the
fact that many benefits are functionally related to wages. In order to allow
for the possibility that nonstatutory factors such as generosity in interpre-
tation, the average actual benefits per case (1967-68) were used as an al-
ternative measure. These data were obtained from the American Insurance
Association. 51
S= error term.
(2) The determinants of wages:
WAGES = a 2.0 + a2.1 (UNION) + a2.2 (SIZE) + a2.3 (CAPITAL)
+O2.4 (EXPER) + a2.5 (SEX) + a%.6 (OCC) + a2.(NW's) + a2.8 (EDUC)
+ a2.9 (AREA) + a2.10 (HOURS) + a2.11 (INJRATE) + a2.12 (WC) + P12
48 Unpublished files, U.S. Manpower Administration, Dep't of Labor.
49 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, DEP'T OF LABOR, STATE SAFETY CODE COMPARISON
STUDiES (1966).
50 Unpublished files, Division of Programming and Research, U.S. Bureau of Labor Standards,
Dep't of Labor.
51 Unpublished files, American Insurance Association, New York, New York.
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Where:
WAGES = average weekly wages as defined above under determinants
of injury rates. 52
UNION = the percentage of employees in establishments where more
than 50 per cent of production employees are covered by a collective bar-
gaining agreement. The data are defined above. 53 This variable is based on
the notion that unions have typically been found to increase wages.
SIZE = the number of employees in the establishment. The data are
defined above.54 It has been hypothesized that the number of employees
in an establishment is positively related to wages. 55 A greater number of em-
ployees is said to require more interdependence among employees and, there-
fore, greater responsibility. More dependable employees, in turn, require
higher wages.
CAPITAL = the gross book value of depreciable assets per employee.
The data are defined above. 56 The ratio of capital to labor is important to
the wage determination process in that a larger amount of capital per worker
may require more dependable as well as more skilled workers.
EXPER = average years of work experience. Experience represents a
human capital investment in workers. The extent to which a worker em-
bodies this capital, his productivity, and hence, his wage, will increase. The
data were obtained from Arthur J. Alexander, Economics Department, Rand
Corporation.57 The variable is derived from a 10 per cent sample of the 1
per cent file of Social Security system members in 1966. The data are at
the 4-digit SIC level of detail for the United States. Due to sample limi-
tations, only ten possible years of experience are considered. These are,
however, the best available estimates of work experience.
SEX = the percentage of women in the work force. The data are de-
scribed above.5" This variable is designed to increase the impact of wage
discrimination against women, hence, a negative coefficient is anticipated.
OCC = the percentage of production employees in the work force. The
data are defined above.59 This variable is a proxy for the occupational mix.
To the extent an industry has more production workers, the industry's wage
level should be lower.
NW's = the percentage of nonwhites in the industry's work force. This
variable is designed to measure the impact of wage discrimination against
nonwhites. The coefficient is, therefore, expected to be negative. The data
are from the 1970 Census and are approximately equivalent to a 3-digit
SIC level of detail. 60
52 Unpublished files, U.S. Manpower Administration, Dep't of Labor.
53 Weiss, supra note 41.
'4 Unpublished files, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor.
-
5 Masters, An Interindustry Analysis of Wages and Plant Size, 51 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 341
(1969).
56 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 43.57 Unpublished files, Rand Corp., Santa Monica, California.
58 Unpublished files, Office of Research and Statistics, Social Security Administration, U.S.
Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare.
59 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 34, at 33-34.
60 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION: CHARAC-
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EDUC = average level of education as described above. 61 Education
represents an investment in human capital which should manifest itself
in higher earnings.
AREA = a regional dummy variable contrasting northern and southern
states. The variable has a value of 1 if a state is in the south. The expected
sign of the coefficient is negative reflecting the lower cost of living in the
south.
HOURS = average weekly hours as described above. 62 Since wages are
measured on a weekly basis it is necessary to account for differences which
are due to differences in the hours of work.
INJRATE = the endogenous injury rate as described above.63 This is
one of the key factors in the model. If private markets control the level of
safety, variations in the injury rate will be manifested in higher wages.
WC = the endogenous workmen's compensation index as described
above. 64 To the extent that an employee's accident costs are covered by
the employer, the costs that need be covered by the employee are decreased.
Therefore, it is expected that as workmen's compensation benefits increase,
the level of wages will decrease.
A2 = error term.
(3) STANDARDS = a3.0 + a3.1 (INC) + a3.2 (UNIONST) + a3.3 (DEATHS)
+ 43. 4 (POP) + a3.5 (EXPINJ) + a 3.6 (COMP) + P1.
(4) WC = a4 .0 + 4.1 (INC) + C4.2 (UNIONST) + a4.3 (DEATHS) + a4 .4 (POP)
+ a4.5 (EXPINJ) + a4.6 (COMP) + a4.7 (WAGES) + /t4.
Where:
STANDARDS = the index of the states' safety standard system as de-
scribed above.65
WC = the workmen's compensation index as described above.66
INC = the states' level of income. Several authors have observed that
the relative wealth or availability of resources to a decision-making unit
is related to its willingness to adopt new and progressive policies.6 7 Since
safety regulation appears to be generally viewed as progressive public
policy, it is, therefore, hypothesized that higher levels of both safety stan-
dards and workmen's compensation result in part from higher relative in-
TERISTICS OF THE POPULATION Table 184 (1973). Table 184 is consistent only throughout parts 2-52 of
volume I (corresponding to each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia). The parts and
their respective states used for the purposes of this study were: pt. 2, Alabama; pt. 5, Arkansas;
pt. 8, Connecticut; pt. 11, Florida; pt. 17, Iowa; pt. 21, Maine; pt. 32, New Jersey; pt. 34, New
York; pt. 40, Pennsylvania; pt. 42, South Carolina; pt. 45, Texas; pt. 48, Virginia; pt. 57, Wisconsin.
61 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 44, at 98.
62 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 34, at 35.
6 Unpublished files, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor.
64 Unpublished files, American Insurance Association, New York, New York. See also text at
note 51 supra.
65 U.S. BuREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, supra note 49; unpublished files, Division of
Programming and Research, U.S. Bureau of Labor Standards, Dep't of Labor.
66 Unpublished files, American Insurance Association, New York, New York. See also
text at note 51 supra.
'
7 Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States, 63 AM. POL. SCI.
REv. 880, 883 (1969).
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come levels. The relative income level variable is based on 1967 mean total
earnings for workers covered by Social Security. The source of the data is
Earnings Distributions in the United States. 68
UNIONST = the number of union members as a percentage of the
state's total labor force. Labor unions are a significant source of the po-
litical pressure for enactment and change in safety regulation. It is, there-
fore, hypothesized that the political strength of the labor movement within
a state is a determinant of both forms of safety regulation. The percentage
of union members is designed as a measure of the political power of the
organized labor movement in each state. Therefore, the expected coeffi-
cient is positive. The data are from the Directory of Labor Unions.0 9
DEATHS = the average accidental death rate in each state for the period
1962 through 1966. A recurring theme in commentaries about safety
regulation is that it results from specific disasters which aroused the
public. The disaster or shock factor as a determinant of the status of reg-
ulation in each state is extremely difficult to measure. By definition, the
shocks are often isolated and unique tragedies. The proxy chosen for this
phenomenon is the average accidental death rate in the state for the
period 1962-66. The notion behind this variable is that a relatively high
death rate from accidents may lead states to strengthen regulation in
anticipation of lowering the rate. The source of the data is the National
Safety Council. 70
POP = the states' population in 1960. Studies have indicated that
organizational size is related to the propensity for innovation.7 1 It is, there-
fore, hypothesized that larger states have greater safety regulation. The data
are from the 1970 Census of Population.72
EXPINJ = the expected injury rate. The industry mix of a state may
also be a factor in explaining the character of regulation in each state.
States with a dominance of relatively safe industries may not feel a need
to have strong regulation. Similarly, the presence of dangerous industries
may create an incentive for strong regulation.
The variable chosen to measure this phenomenon is the expected injury
rate. The rate was measured as follows. First, for the total United States
an average frequency rate of injury was calculated for each 2-digit SIC
manufacturing industry. These data were based on the period 1958 through
1966. This represents the years for which comparable data are available.
Second, for each state, employment by 2-digit industry was averaged over
the same time period. Third, the expected injury rate is the weighted
68 SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, EARNINGS Dis-
TRIBUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1967 (DHEW Pub. No. (SSA) 72-11900, 1971).
09 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1665, DIRECTORY OF NA-
TIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LABOR UNIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1969, at 76 (1970).
70 NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 18 (1967); NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT
FACTS 18 (1966); NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 18 (1965); NATIONAL SAFETY
COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 18 (1964); NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 18 (1963).
71 Walker, supra note 67.
7 1 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION: CHAR-
ACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION pt. 1 (U.S. Summary), § I Table 8, at 1-48, 1-49 (1973).
724
CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS
average of the U.S. total industry frequency rates where, for each state,
the weights are the states' 2-digit employment averages. The source of the
frequency rates for the United States is the Handbook of Labor Statistics,
1970. 73 The source for each state's employment mix is Employment
and Earnings, States and Areas, 1939-69.7
4
COMP = political competitiveness within a state. Political science studies
suggest that the competitiveness of political parties is a factor in the formu-
lation of public policy. This notion is based on the concept that a political
party facing a closely contested election will be more prone to offer new
and progressive legislation as a means of rallying support to their party. The
measure of party competitiveness chosen is the average percentage of votes
going to the dominant political party in statewide elections over the period
1940 to 1964.75 If neither party in a two-party system is dominant, the
measure would equal 50 per cent. A negative coefficient would indicate that
competitiveness does result in more regulation.
WAGES = the endogenous average weekly level as described above.
76
This variable is applicable only to workmen's compensation benefits. As
wages increase, potential benefits increase because benefits are often
stated as a percentage of wages.
g and ft4 = error terms.
The model was estimated using a cross-sectional data base of 2,627 firms
from 13 states in 1967. Two-stage least squares was the estimation proce-
dure used. The determinants of injury rates equation is not based on well
established theory or previous empirical work; therefore, an analysis of
covariance across industries was performed on the reduced form equation.
This analysis demonstrated that, while the specified independent variables
perform similarly across the industries within the sample, factors not spec-
ified are causing inter-industry variations. Such a circumstance implies
that dummy variables representing the inter-industry structure should be
placed in the equation. The covariance analysis indicates that the inter-
industry variations occur at both a durable-nondurable level and at a 2-digit
SIC level.
In the estimation of the full four equation model, the industry dummy
variable structure was limited to the durable-nondurable categorization
77
rather than the more detailed 2-digit SIC categorization. The 2-digit SIC
categorization would require sixteen dummy variables which when added to
the other independent variables would exceed the available computational
capacity for simultaneous equations.
The model was estimated with alternative subsets of the data base. To
test the possibility that the hypothesized relationships are different for
73 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1666, HANDBOOK OF
LABOR STATISTICS 364 (1970).
74 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1370-7, EMPLOYMENT AND
EARNINGS: STATES AND AREAS, 1929-69 (1970).
75 Pfeiffer, The Measurement of Inter-Party Competition and Systematic Stability, 61 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 457, 459 (1967).
76 Unpublished files, U.S. Manpower Administration, Dep't of Labor.
7 See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 36.
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larger and smaller firms, the model was estimated with data bases which
included only the largest 10 per cent and the smallest 10 per cent of sampled
firms. The model was also estimated for the middle 80 per cent of sampled
firms.
There was also concern that the estimates are influenced by the uneven
distribution of firms across states. To test this possibility, data bases were
created which weighted the number of observations in each state so as to
approximately equalize their interstate distribution. This weighting pro-
cedure was used on the original sample as well as the top 10 per cent,
bottom 10 per cent, and middle 80 per cent samples.
The wage equation yielded coefficients which generally conformed to
expectations. Positive coefficients which were large relative to their
standard errors78 were found for the measures of unionization, capital-
labor ratio, experience, and education. The coefficients on the percentage
of women, the percentage of production employees, and the southern state
dummy variable (area) were negative and large relative to their standard
error. The coefficient on the number of employees was small relative to its
standard error except in the model estimated with the severity rate. Con-
trary to expectations, the percentage of nonwhites and the level of work-
men's compensation benefits had positive coefficients. The benefit level
coefficient was large relative to its standard error in the estimates using the
severity and frequency rates but not with serious injury frequency rate.
The negative sign on each of the alternative measures of the endogenous
injury rate variable was also contrary to expectations. 79
The estimation of the equation with workmen's compensation benefits
as the dependent variable yielded five coefficients which conformed to hy-
potheses and two which did not conform. As hypothesized, the level of state
income, the percentage of the labor force unionized, the number of in-
dustrial deaths, the measure of expected injuries, and the endogenous
wage rate all had positive coefficients that were large relative to their
standard errors. The coefficient on the states' population was negative
and the coefficient on the index of political competition was positive, both
of which are contrary to the hypotheses. The independent variables in the
regulation via controls equation all had coefficients which were small relative
to their standard errors.
The use of alternative measures of the injury rate demonstrated some
important differences in the injury rate equation. Although the frequency
rate of all injuries and the frequency rate of serious injuries produced gen-
erally similar results, the severity rate did not. The equation with the
severity rate produced positive coefficients for the capital-labor ratio, the
length of the waiting period, and the level of workmen's compensation bene-
78 Standard tests of significance are not applicable to the second stage equations of two-
stage least squares estimation. However, with a large sample such as that used to estimate these
equations, the usual standards of significance are generally regarded as an indication of
reliability.
" The low correlation coefficients among independent variables indicate that multi-
collinearity is not a problem.
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fits which were all large relative to standard errors. There were negative co-
efficients on the percentage of women and the wage rate. All other coefficients
were quite small relative to their standard errors. This relative lack of sig-
nificant variables is consistent with the insurance industry's claim that severity
rates contain a larger random component than other measures and, therefore,
are a less desirable measure of a firm's injury experience than frequency
rates.
As hypothesized the coefficient on the new hires rate was positive and
large relative to its standard error in both the frequency rate and serious
injury frequency rate equations. Negative coefficients which conform to
hypotheses were found in both equations for the unemployment rate and
the number of employees in the establishment. The percentage of women
coefficient which had no hypothesis as to sign was negative and reliable. The
capital-labor ratio was negative and large relative to its standard error. Con-
trary to expectations the unionization and workmen's compensation variables
had positive significant coefficients. Also contrary to expectations, the pro-
duction employees and wage variables had negative coefficients that
were large relative to their standard errors. The change in average weekly
hours and waiting period variables had coefficients that were small relative
to their standard errors. The regulation via controls index had a positive
coefficient large relative to its standard error in the serious injury equation,
but it was insignificant in the frequency rate equation. The average age
variable was insignificant in the serious injury equation but negative and
large relative to standard error in the frequency rate equation. The education
variable had a negative coefficient in the serious injury frequency rate
equation but an insignificant coefficient in the frequency rate equation.
The model was also estimated using alternative measures for other vari-
ables whenever available. The use of actual benefits as a measure of
workmen's compensation also produced results similar to the original spec-
ification. The use of safety budget per nonagricultural employee rather than
the index of regulation produced no important change in results; however,
the R2 in the controls equation which contains no endogenous independent
variables dropped from .33 with the index as the dependent variable to
.16 with budget. In order to determine whether these results were related
to the fact that the determinants of controls equation had no significant
independent variables, the model was re-estimated with controls assumed to
be exogenous rather than endogenous. Under this assumption the controls
index and safety budget variables remained insignificant in the frequency
rate and severity rate equations. The controls index was insignificant in the
serious injury rate equation but the safety budget remained positive (the
ratio of the safety budget coefficient to its standard error was 3.8).
The data base contains 2,627 observations which are not evenly distri-
buted across states. This unequal distribution gives rise to concern that the
estimated relationships between state regulation and the injury rates were
dominated by the experience of a subset of states. To investigate this pos-
sibility a sample was created which resulted from weighting the original
observations in each state so as to approximately equalize the number of ob-
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servations in each state. The state with the largest number of observations
was New York with 628 firms. The weighting procedure was to multiply the
observations in every other state by a factor which resulted in approx-
imately 628 observations. For example, Texas has 215 observations and was,
therefore, weighted by a factor of 2.9.
To achieve the 2.9 weighting, each original observation was reproduced
twice, reflecting the integer component of the factor. In order to achieve
the fractional component of the factor, a random sample of the original
observations was drawn so as to yield an additional 90 per cent sample.
These files were then combined to yield a state sample of 2.9 times as large
as the original.
As a further test of generality, subsamples of the original data were
drawn based on the number of employees in the firm. The subsamples were
the 10 per cent largest firms, the 10 per cent smallest firms, and the re-
maining 80 per cent of middle-sized firms. Each of these subsamples was
also weighted so as to approximately equalize the number of observations
in each state.
The controls equation was not subjected to weighting in either the full
sample or the firm size dependent subsamples. All variables in this equation
were dependent only on the state, and the original estimation was based on
one set of observations from each of the 40 states for which data were
available. Hence, equal weighting of states was implicit in the original
estimation.
The following results are based on the full unweighted sample of 2,627
firms with the frequency rate as the measure of the injury rate, the com-
posite index as the measure of standards, and the benefit level index as
the measure of workmen's compensation. The numbers in parentheses are
the ratios of the coefficients to the standard errors.
(1) INJRATE = - 3.57 + 3.72 (NEWHIRES) - 15.60 (UNE) + 1.32 (HOURS)
(.22) (7.05) (3.46) (4.86)
- .38 (AGE) +.13 (UNION) - .001 (SIZE) - .04 (CAPITAL) - 2.0 (EDUC)
(2.20) (5.09) (4.35) (.92) (3.38)
-. 16 (SEX) - .04 (OCC) + .04 (WAIT) - .83 (WAGE) - .000007 (STANDARDS)
(4.69) (.91) (.10) (1.39) (1.10)
+ .01 (WC) + 2.80 (DURABLES)
(3.84) (2.86)
R2 = .165
Standard Error 294.10
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(2) WAGES = -36.27 + .17 (UNION) + .00004 (SIZE) + .32 (CAPITAL)
(1.82) (4.18) (.07) (5.24)
+ .25 (EXPER) - .55 (SEX) - .47 (OCC) + 3.46 (NW's) + 4.80 (EDUC)
(3.90) (10.98) (8.47) (5.60) (5.50)
- 22.59 (AREA) + 3.44 (HOURS) - 1.18 (INJRATE) + .01 (WC)
(10.28) (8.33) (8.38) (4.44)
R 2 = .405
Standard Error 704.31
(3) STANDARDS = -86613.51 + 31.12 (INC) + 376.82 (UNIONST)
(.62) (1.45)
- 113.35 (DEATHS) - 4.89 (POP) + 231.53 (EXPINJ) - 890.45 (COMP)
(.70) (1.05) (.82) (.43)
R 2 = .337
Standard Error 87285.14
(4) WC = -4001.40 + .77 (INC) + 7.69 (UNIONST) + .17 (DEATHS)
(45.66) (69.17) (11.23) (40.04)
- .05 (POP) + 2.78 (EXPINJ) + 13.22 (COMP) + 2.70 (WAGES)
(70.68) (19.54) (21.76) (33.01)
R 2 = .886
Standard Error 11227.00
